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Sophia Z. Lee

A Revolution at War with Itself? Preserving
Employment Preferences from Weber to Ricci
abstract. Two aspects of the constitutional transformation Bruce Ackerman describes in
The Civil Rights Revolution were on a collision course, one whose trajectory has implications for
Ackerman’s account and for his broader theory of constitutional change. Ackerman makes a
compelling case that what he terms “reverse state action” (the targeting of private actors) and
“government by numbers” (the use of statistics to identify and remedy violations of civil rights
laws) defined the civil rights revolution. Together they “requir[ed] private actors, as well as state
officials, to . . . realize the principles of constitutional equality” and allowed the federal
government to “actually achieve egalitarian advances in the real world.” Within the frame of
Ackerman’s study, these features of the civil rights revolution worked in tandem, perhaps even
synergistically, helping to generate the period’s remarkable changes in voting, employment, and
education. But as this essay shows, at least in the case of employment discrimination, reverse
state action quickly became a threat to government by numbers. In the 1970s, no sooner did
numerical measures take hold in preventing, settling, and remedying employment
discrimination than courts faced claims that these measures violated the very laws pursuant to
which they had been adopted. Exactly when and where state action adhered ultimately helped
decide the viability of the numerical approach in the new employment discrimination regime.
The eventual tensions between the “government by numbers” and “reverse state action” strands
of Ackerman’s account raise questions about the content and viability of the civil rights
revolution he documents. They also underscore the importance of refining his theory’s account
of what he terms consolidation, synthesis, and judicial betrayal.
author. Assistant Professor of Law and History, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to
thank Maria da Silva for outstanding research assistance; Christine Jolls and Reva Siegel for
helpful comments; and the Journal’s editors for their help polishing the piece. I am deeply
indebted to Bruce Ackerman for inviting me to participate in this symposium and for being such
an inspirational teacher and scholar.
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introduction
In January 1973, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
reached a pathbreaking settlement with American Telephone & Telegraph
(AT&T). The agency, created to implement the employment discrimination
title (Title VII) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,1 had a rough start, plagued by
uneven leadership, insufficient staff, and underfunding that resulted in
enormous backlogs.2 The AT&T settlement marked a turn in its fortunes. The
case was sui generis. As the district court asked to approve the agreement noted,
“there was no significant pending litigation in the federal courts when this
consent decree was signed or . . . when the extensive negotiations that led to
the decree took place.”3 The EEOC’s Chairman, William H. Brown III, called it
“the most significant legal settlement in the civil rights employment history.”4
The agency’s “comparatively low profile . . . was strikingly altered” by the
agreement.5 Nowhere was this more the case than within the business
community: “There is a lot of teeth-chattering going on around here,” a vicepresident of a large retail chain observed; equal employment consulting firms
multiplied as their market of worried employers grew.6

1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2006).
3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 180-81 (2014)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS]; HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA:
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-1972, at 203-04, 234-37 (1990);
JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 120-25 (1996).
EEOC v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1030 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Jo Anne Levine, Landmark Bias Case Settlement, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1973, at G1, G7.
Douglas W. Cray, Job Discrimination Charges Grow: Federal Agency’s Efforts Broaden, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1973, at F14.
Harvey D. Shapiro, Women on the Line, Men at the Switchboard: Equal Employment
Opportunity Comes to the Bell System, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 20, 1973, at 26, 90. The AT&T
settlement resolved a massive action the EEOC initiated against AT&T under Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) rules requiring the company to ensure equal
employment. It also addressed pending charges against the company by the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) and other offices within the Labor Department. For
general accounts of the settlement, see VENUS GREEN, RACE ON THE LINE: GENDER, LABOR,
AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE BELL SYSTEM, 1880–1980 (2001); LOIS KATHRYN HERR, WOMEN,
POWER, AND AT&T: WINNING RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE (2003); and MARJORIE A.
STOCKFORD, THE BELLWOMEN: THE STORY OF THE LANDMARK AT&T SEX DISCRIMINATION
CASE (2004). For accounts of the FCC’s adoption of equal employment rules and why they
put pressure on AT&T to settle, see SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM
THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at ch. 8) (on file with
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The AT&T case plays a small but pivotal role in Bruce Ackerman’s
compelling new book, The Civil Rights Revolution.7 This is the third volume in
his series contending that Americans have developed an alternate system of
“higher-lawmaking” in response to the near impossibility of formally
amending the Constitution via Article V. According to Ackerman, all three
branches periodically interact with each other and a mobilized electorate in a
sustained way over time to formulate new extra-textual constitutional
commitments.8 His latest installment claims that the “Second Reconstruction”
was an instance of this extra-Article V amendment process and elaborates the
substance of the resulting commitments.9 One of Ackerman’s key claims is that
rather than adopt a universal, abstract notion of equality, Americans employed
what he calls a “sphere-by-sphere” approach in which the legitimate means for
achieving equality were fitted to different structures of inequality. So, for
instance, although there was a general commitment to achieving “real-world
egalitarian gains,”10 Ackerman explains that the constitutionally acceptable
means for doing so varied for voting rights as opposed to public
accommodations.11
For Ackerman, the AT&T case typified one foundational feature of the
constitutional revolution regarding employment discrimination and helped
forge another. First, by targeting private employers such as AT&T, Ackerman
argues that Title VII fundamentally altered “the state action doctrine of the
nineteenth century,” which he notes typically “insulate[d] private actors from
[the Constitution’s] egalitarian principles but impose[d] them rigorously on
all state actors.”12 Second, the AT&T case helped refine how the employment
discrimination dimension of this constitutional revolution would employ what
Ackerman refers to as “government by numbers”: the use of statistics to
identify and remedy civil rights violations.13 In a 20,000-page report replete

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

author) [hereinafter LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION]; and Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex,
and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96
VA. L. REV. 799 (2010) [hereinafter Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking].
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2.
See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2; see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF
JIM CROW 9 (1955) (coining the phrase “Second Reconstruction”).
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 14.
Id. at 107-53.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 14.
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with statistical analyses, the EEOC used AT&T to model employment
discrimination systemically and nationwide.14 The AT&T settlement also set
numerical hiring goals and timetables for their fulfillment.15 According to
Ackerman, the acceptance of the AT&T case in the executive branch and
Congress secured the legitimacy of using numerical measures to remedy, not
only identify and prove, employment discrimination.16
Ackerman is right to highlight the significance of the AT&T settlement. As
described above, it was the kind of lightning-rod case that could generate the
public and governmental response that fuels Ackerman’s theory. Going
forward, it also became the template for government enforcement of Title
VII.17 During the summer of 1973, the EEOC filed 150 cases against major
corporations and assembled a national team of lawyers to “do the same thing as
[AT&T] all over again.”18 As Ackerman observes, over the next few years, the
EEOC secured court-approved consent decrees implementing similar numberbased remedies in a range of industries.19
The AT&T case, however, also illuminates unexplored tensions within
Ackerman’s argument. In the two years after the federal district court approved
the AT&T agreement, a number of the company’s unions petitioned the court
to modify its consent decree.20 They contended, among other things, that by
imposing numerical goals, the consent decree violated Title VII and the
Constitution’s equal protection guarantees.21 The district court easily dismissed

14.

15.
16.

17.
18.

19.
20.
21.

Phyllis A. Wallace, Introduction, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND THE AT&T CASE
1, 2 (Phyllis A. Wallace ed., 1976); Christopher Lydon, Job Bias at Bell Charged by Panel:
20,000-Page Report Finds Women Are Oppressed – Policy on Blacks Scored, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
1971, at A1.
EEOC v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1032 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 182-83, 189-91. This claim may require more
development since the AT&T settlement occurred after, rather than before, Congress
amended Title VII in 1972.
See generally LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6; STOCKFORD, supra note 6,
at 209-10; Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking, supra note 6.
Levine, supra note 4, at G1. Months before the AT&T settlement, Congress had amended
Title VII to give the EEOC the authority to bring lawsuits challenging private employers’
discrimination. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat. 103, 107 (1972) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c)-(e) (2006)).
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 183; see, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 330 n.4 (1977).
EEOC v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1028-29 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
Id. at 1030-33. They brought their claims under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
per the Supreme Court’s holding that this Clause incorporated equal protection principles.
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their claims in 1976, citing abundant precedent.22 The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals quickly affirmed, but cautioned that preferential remedies were not
categorically constitutional and “must be held invalid under the . . . Fifth
Amendment unless” they satisfied “strict scrutiny.”23 In the appeals court’s
judgment, the AT&T agreement met this test.24 The Supreme Court had not
yet applied strict scrutiny to racial preferences adopted to remedy or prevent
discrimination.25 But over the next decade, the Supreme Court found an
increasing number of preferential schemes to be unconstitutional.26 During
this same period, the Court gave greater leeway to preferences under
Title VII.27
The “reverse-state-action” and “government-by-numbers” aspects of
Ackerman’s constitutional revolution were on a collision course. With
preferential treatment more liberally allowed under Title VII than under the
Constitution, using numbers to address employment discrimination became
incompatible with applying the Constitution to the private sector. Instead,
ensuring that the state action doctrine “insulate[d] ‘private’ actors from the
[Constitution’s] egalitarian principles” ended up protecting the “governmentby-numbers” approach to employment discrimination.28
Part I explains in greater depth Ackerman’s claim that the civil rights
revolution included a major reworking of the state action doctrine and an
embrace of numerical approaches to achieving equality. It also explains why
employment is a particularly ripe site to explore the tensions between them.
Part II demonstrates how the Court’s preservation of the nineteenth-century
state action doctrine helped preserve the use of numbers to achieve equality in
the workplace when employers’ voluntary use of preferences first came before
the Court in the 1970s. Part III explains how this state action shield further
protected these preferences in the 1980s, both before the Supreme Court and
within President Ronald Reagan’s administration. Part IV argues that the state

22.
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 1044-45 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).
Id. at 1044-51, 1053-54.
EEOC v. AT&T, 556 F.2d 167, 179 (3d Cir. 1977).
Id. at 179-80. The Supreme Court denied review. Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. EEOC, 438
U.S. 915 (1978); Tel. Coordinating Council, TCC-1, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. EEOC,
438 U.S. 915 (1978); Alliance of Indep. Tel. Unions v. EEOC, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
See infra Part III.
See id.
See id.
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 13.

2969

the yale law journal

123:2964

2014

action doctrine could once again rescue voluntary employer preferences. The
Conclusion raises some possible implications of this history for the stability of
the civil rights revolution Ackerman documents and for his broader theory of
constitutional change.
i. reverse state action and government by numbers in
ackerman’s revolution
Ackerman’s civil rights revolution has three key characteristics: it took a
“sphere-by-sphere” approach to codifying the Constitution’s equality
guarantee, it employed “government by numbers” to achieve this constitutional
goal (albeit to varying degrees in each of the spheres), and it extended this
constitutional mandate to the private sector. The result was targeted statutes
and tailored administrative regimes customized to the particular structures of
inequality in voting, public education, housing, public accommodations, and
employment. As I explain below, these latter two characteristics coincided to
the greatest degree in employment, making it a prime site to explore the
tensions between them.
A. Sphere by Sphere
Ackerman argues that the Supreme Court’s increasingly consistent
insistence that equal protection is achieved through colorblind policies betrays
a central tenet of the civil rights revolution.29 Ackerman traces this tenet back
to Chief Justice Earl Warren’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.30 “In
making its case against ‘separate-but-equal,’” Ackerman contends, Brown’s
reasoning “doesn’t apply to all social relationships across the board” but
instead “requires the law to single out crucial spheres for the vindication of
equality.”31 When Congress enacted a series of civil rights statutes in the 1960s
and early 1970s, it adopted this approach, Ackerman argues, “self-consciously

29.

30.
31.

ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 231; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 861-65 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (characterizing
the plurality’s colorblind approach as “risk[ing] serious harm to the law and for the
Nation”); cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579-80 (2009) (“Whatever the City’s ultimate
aim—however well intentioned or benevolent it might have seemed—the City made its
employment decision because of race.”).
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 129-33 (describing the “sphere-by-sphere
approach” articulated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 131.
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divid[ing] the world into different spheres of life: public accommodations,
education, employment, housing, voting.”32 Congress’s goal in each sphere was
the same: “the pursuit of real equality of opportunity.”33 But Congress had a
“contextual understanding of the constitutional meaning of equality in
different spheres of social and political life.”34 As a result, it “displayed great
creativity in crafting different administrative setups for different spheres,”
which in turn “led to the development of different rules and principles in
different spheres.”35 For Ackerman, it was these “landmark statutes,” with their
sphere-by-sphere approach, not the Court’s increasingly formalist,
homogenous approach to equality in decisions such as Loving v. Virginia, that
defined the civil rights revolution and merit “full constitutional status.”36
B. Government by Numbers
Congress, the executive branch, and the courts deployed “government by
numbers” to varying degrees in each sphere of discrimination they targeted.
One of Ackerman’s great insights is how the civil rights revolution brought the
technocratic impulse of the New Deal to bear on the problem of racial
inequality.37 Government by numbers was used, Ackerman argues, only where
necessary “to bridge the yawning gap between the law on the books and the
law of ordinary life.”38 Generally, this involved discrimination by “institutions
whose internal logics of decision are opaque”39 or who were structurally
disinclined to comply.40 Government by numbers was used paradigmatically in
the Voting Rights Act, which “imposed hard-edged output tests on voting
registrars” and extensive federal supervision on those that failed.41 In contrast,

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 34; see also id. at 291 (“I do deny that Loving deserves a central place in the civil rights
canon. It simply represents an effort by We the Judges to fill in a gap left in the wake of an
epochal set of decisions by We the People.”).
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 154-73.
Id. at 194. As Ackerman observes, the Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612 (2013), which struck down the Voting Rights Act provision that set the formula used to
determine the states that must preclear changes to their voting laws with the Department of

2971

the yale law journal

123:2964

2014

it played no role in policing public accommodations, where discrimination was
patent and the market rewarded compliance.42 Here, Congress “principally
relied on traditional lawsuits by traditional plaintiffs before traditional courts
using traditional legal language to attack discrimination.”43
But government by numbers was not an all or nothing proposition,
Ackerman reveals. True to the sphere-by-sphere approach, in the case of
employment discrimination, the civil rights revolution settled on an
intermediate position. As initially enacted, Title VII focused on individual
intentional discrimination and forbade numerical quotas, “the hard-edged
version of government by numbers” used in voting.44 But Congress did not
banish numbers entirely. They could be—and were—used as evidence of
discriminatory intent,45 to identify suspicious employer policies, and to target
the EEOC’s limited enforcement resources on the “worst offenders.”46 The
EEOC also used them to demonstrate that discrimination was a systemic, not
individual or intentional, problem.47 These uses in turn encouraged businesses
to tend to their numbers and to adopt policies that lowered any numerical red
flags. “Within the setting of the modern enterprise,” Ackerman observes,
“discriminatory intentions had become a numbers-driven affair.”48 First the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power,49 then Congress and President
Richard Nixon endorsed these uses of numbers in the 1972 amendments to
Title VII.50 The result was a cascade of firms seeking consent decrees, adopting
affirmative action programs, and being subject to judgments that used
numbers to create preferences for hiring, training, and promoting minorities
and women.51

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

49.
50.
51.

Justice, has thrown into doubt the future viability of government by numbers under the
Voting Rights Act. ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 328-35.
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 159.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 187. For similar accounts of corporate practices, see generally JENNIFER DELTON,
RACIAL INTEGRATION IN CORPORATE AMERICA, 1940-1990 (2009); and FRANK DOBBINS,
INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2011).
401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 184-86 (discussing
Griggs).
See ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 189-91.
See infra Part III.

2972

a revolution at war with itself?

C. Reverse State Action
Another central claim of Ackerman’s is that the civil rights revolution cast
aside the state action limit on the Constitution’s equality guarantee. Ackerman
argues that the Supreme Court “was on the verge of dispatching the state
action doctrine in its 1964 decision in Bell v. Maryland,” a case involving the
trespassing convictions of sit-in protesters at a Baltimore, Maryland
restaurant.52 But he acknowledges that it “refrained at the last minute since
Congress was poised to take leadership on this issue with the Civil Rights
Act.”53 Nor did the Court in his account later take the step it had avoided in
Bell. Nonetheless, he contends that the “state action restriction simply doesn’t
make sense of the living Constitution.”54 For Ackerman, the Constitution
includes the commitments “expressed in the landmark [civil rights] statutes.”55
And these “requir[ed] private actors as well as state officials to accept wideranging responsibilities to realize the principles of constitutional equality.”56
Indeed, from Title VII, to the Civil Rights Act’s public accommodations title,
to the Fair Housing Act, these statutes engaged in what Ackerman calls
“reverse state action,” singling out the private sector.57 Ackerman notes that
“[t]he current legal community uses Bell’s deference to Congress as an excuse
for pretending that the state action doctrine of the nineteenth century remains
intact.”58 He urges, however, that doing so is “[a] big mistake.”59

52.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

58.
59.

Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 13. A
majority of Justices nearly coalesced around finding that the state’s arrest and conviction of
the protesters at the behest of the restaurant’s private owner violated equal protection. Id. at
143-47; LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 (manuscript at ch. 7). Instead,
the Court remanded the case to the state court to determine whether a public
accommodations antidiscrimination law Maryland adopted after the protesters’ convictions
rendered their sit-in legally protected. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 175. Ackerman uses this term to refer to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which
targeted discrimination in private employment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000e (2006). I use it
here more broadly to refer to all regulation of private discrimination even under the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31, Title II’s ban on discrimination in public
accommodations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, and Title VII after it was amended in 1972 to reach
public as well as private employment discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 13.
Id. at 176.
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* * *
Neither reverse state action nor government by numbers characterizes
every sphere Ackerman analyzes. As explained above, reverse state action
pertained only to employment, housing, and public accommodations; of these,
government by numbers was employed most thoroughly in the employment
discrimination context.60 Within the timeframe of Ackerman’s account, these
two aspects of the civil rights revolution coexisted harmoniously. But no more
than a few years thereafter, harmony gave way to conflict.
ii. the state action doctrine preserves government by
numbers in weber
When the Third Circuit applied strict scrutiny to the AT&T consent decree
in 1977, it was stepping out ahead of the Supreme Court, which had yet to
adopt this standard of review for racial preferences designed to remedy racial
discrimination. But the next year, in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, the Court signaled that it was considering the Third Circuit’s approach
and sounded a warning about remedial use of preferences under the landmark
civil rights statutes.61 As this Part recounts, Bakke was but the opening salvo in
a complicated, multi-front reconsideration of government by numbers in the
employment context. Over the next decade, the government-by-numbers
dimension of Title VII clashed repeatedly with the Supreme Court’s
increasingly colorblind interpretations of the Constitution. When it came to
employers’ voluntary use of preferences, the Court’s formalist, narrow
approach to state action helped preserve the government-by-numbers
approach.

60.

61.

Ackerman does not focus on the use of numbers in the housing context, but he briefly
mentions the government’s use of a disparate impact standard. Id. at 222. As a result, I too
focus on the coincidence of reverse state action and government by numbers in the
employment context only. The Court may soon confront the issues raised by this
coincidence in the housing context. See Twp. of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Garden Citizens in
Action, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013) (mem.) (dismissing after settlement a challenge in which
the constitutionality of disparate impact liability under the Fair Housing Act was
questioned).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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A. The Growing Constitutional Threat to Racial Preferences
Racial preferences in hiring, promotion, and training were already
controversial in 1973 when the EEOC entered into its pathbreaking agreement
with AT&T. In 1972, both presidential candidates denounced the use of quotas
and even some prominent liberals criticized the Nixon administration’s use of
hiring goals.62 The Nixon Administration described the former as a number
that “managers are obligated to attain” and the latter as one that would
“probably be met.”63 To liberal opponents of quotas, however, this was a
distinction without a difference. They thought that goals often functioned as
“de facto quotas.” Even more fundamentally, however, they opposed any
departure from meritocratic hiring. From this baseline, probable goals were no
better than mandatory quotas.64 Labor leaders also criticized hiring goals, let
alone quotas, for harmfully pitting white and black workers against each other.
Guaranteeing jobs for all, not quotas, was the labor movement’s answer to
African Americans’ limited job opportunities.65 Conservatives formulated a
different critique, embracing colorblindness as the sine qua non of equal
protection. Under this by now familiar formulation, recognizing race to
remedy or prevent discrimination was constitutionally equivalent to
recognizing race in order to discriminate.66
Bakke signaled the rising influence of the colorblind approach. In that case,
the Court was asked to determine whether a university program setting a

62.
63.

64.

65.

66.

LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 (manuscript at ch. 8); Lee, Race, Sex, and
Rulemaking, supra note 6, at 862.
Memorandum from the National Executive Council of the United States Civil Service
Commission to the Heads of Departments and Agencies (May 11, 1971) (on file with
author).
Am. Jewish Comm., “Statement on Affirmative Action,” Dec. 3, 1972, LCCR Papers, Part I,
Box 114, “Quota Hiring: Affirmative Action, 1972” Folder. For more thorough treatments of
liberal Jewish groups’ disagreements over and critiques of quotas, see DENNIS DESLIPPE,
PROTESTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE STRUGGLE OVER EQUALITY AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (2012); LAURA KALMAN, RIGHT STAR RISING: A NEW POLITICS, 1974-1980, at
183-84, 191-94 (2010); and NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF
THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 185-224 (2008).
For a nuanced account of labor’s position on affirmative action, see DESLIPPE, supra note 64.
For additional general treatments of the complicated politics of affirmative action, see
JEFFERSON COWIE, STAYIN’ ALIVE: THE 1970S AND THE LAST DAYS OF THE WORKING CLASS,
240-43 (2010); and Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004).
On the rise of colorblind conservatives, see DESLIPPE, supra note 64; and MACLEAN, supra
note 64, at ch. 7.

2975

the yale law journal

123:2964

2014

minimum quota for minority admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.67 The Justices splintered so
thoroughly that it was hard to conclude anything definite from the decision
other than that the admissions program was illegal. But in the Court’s first
decision reviewing voluntary race-conscious measures adopted to remedy or
prevent discrimination, colorblind arguments were key. Justice Powell
endorsed a colorblind interpretation of equal protection, calling for strict
scrutiny any time the government treated people differently based on their
race.68 He found that the admissions policy failed this standard.69 Four other
Justices avoided the constitutional question by interpreting Title VI in equally
ominous, and fatal, colorblind terms.70
When the Court considered a similar quota-based training program
adopted by a private sector employer and union the next term, it seemed
possible that the Court would strike it down under a colorblind approach to
Title VII, equal protection, or both. Title VII had already been interpreted in
ways that defied a strictly colorblind approach, giving the program a better
chance under Title VII than it would have had under Title VI.71 But this would
only remove the dodge used by the Justices who struck down the admissions
program in Bakke on statutory grounds. That a constitutional decision would
be close was near certain: Bakke had been a five-four decision.72 That

67.
68.

69.
70.

71.

72.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006)).
See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“Racial
and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting
judicial examination.”).
See id. at 320. Powell also stated, however, that some uses of race in the admissions context
might be constitutional. See id. at 314-19.
See id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he
meaning of the Title VI ban . . . is crystal clear: Race cannot be the basis of excluding anyone
from participation in a federally funded program.”). Powell reached the constitutional
question because he held that Title VI’s bar on discrimination was coextensive with the
constitutional bar on discriminatory state action. See id. at 287 (plurality opinion).
See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 (1977) (“[T]he Court has
repeatedly held that a prima facie Title VII violation may be established by policies or
practices that are neutral on their face and in intent but that nonetheless discriminate in
effect against a particular group.”); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971)
(recognizing disparate impact theories of discrimination as cognizable under Title VII).
The four dissenting Justices agreed with Justice Powell that Title VI “prohibits only those
uses of racial criteria that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if employed by a State
or its agencies.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). They would have applied
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colorblind constitutionalists would command a majority striking the training
program down was entirely possible. Or at least, it would have been if the
Supreme Court had recognized that the civil rights revolution had swept away
the state action doctrine.
B. Employer Preferences’ State Action Shield
1. Narrowing State Action
Kaiser Aluminum’s quota-based training program was saved from the
constitutional gauntlet because the Supreme Court had not rejected the state
action doctrine in or since Bell.73 The Court began broadening the definition of
state action in the 1940s,74 and came close to vastly expanding it in Bell.75 Over
the next several years, the Court continued to inch its way towards a more
expansive understanding of state action,76 leading one court watcher to predict
that the “radical changes in society . . . even now are tolling the demise of state
action.”77 But this progression of decisions can overstate the doctrine’s
vulnerability. Even liberals at the time were deeply divided over its fate.78 The
Justices who signed on to the Court’s most expansive decisions insisted that
they were preserving an intelligible line between public, constitutionally
accountable actions and those that were private and thus free from
constitutional scrutiny.79 When President Nixon replaced Earl Warren with a
Chief Justice strongly opposed to state action’s expansive trend, he tipped the

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

79.

intermediate, not strict, scrutiny, however, and would have upheld the program on
constitutional and statutory grounds. See id. at 326, 359, 362.
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
See LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 (manuscript at ch. 4); Michael
Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1991).
ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 143-49; accord LEE, THE WORKPLACE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 (manuscript at ch. 7).
See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
John Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the “State Action” Limit on the Equal Protection
Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855, 855 (1966).
For liberals’ divisions, see LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 (manuscript
at chs. 4-5, 7). For arguments that “regime politics” played an underappreciated role in the
doctrine’s preservation, see Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 273 (2010).
See, e.g., Reitman, 387 U.S. at 378-81. For the Justices’ internal deliberations and concerns
about state action in this period, see LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6
(manuscript at chs. 4, 7, 10).
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balance firmly in favor of contraction. Over the course of the 1970s, the Court
issued a series of decisions narrowing the circumstances under which state
action would be found,80 the most recent of which was decided the same term
as Bakke.81
2. Dodging the Equal Protection Bullet in Weber
This narrowed state action doctrine allowed the Court to avoid deciding
the constitutionality of Kaiser’s training program. Writing for the majority in
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, Justice Brennan began by noting that
“[s]ince the Kaiser-USWA plan does not involve state action, this case does not
present an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”82 He instead
considered whether it furthered Title VII’s overarching purpose of opening
jobs to African Americans. The state action divide otherwise critically informed
Brennan’s analysis. In order to distance Title VII from Bakke’s colorblind
interpretation of Title VI, Brennan insisted that Title VII as originally enacted
“regulate[d] purely private decisionmaking and was not intended to
incorporate and particularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.”83 When divining Title VII’s purpose, Brennan emphasized that
Congress had sought to “avoid undue federal regulation of private businesses,”
most notably by not “limit[ing] traditional business freedom to such a degree
as to prohibit all voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action.”84 Justice
Rehnquist accused Brennan of a “Houdini”-like opinion that “eludes clear
statutory language [prohibiting racial discrimination], uncontradicted

80.

81.
82.

83.
84.

See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (articulating the “close nexus”
test); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 119-20 (1973)
(distinguishing between encouragement and permission and finding the latter insufficient
to implicate state action); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972) (rejecting
the licensing theory of state action); LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6
(manuscript at ch. 10).
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200 (1979). For arguments that, under
a more expansive definition of state action, the union would be a state actor, see LEE, THE
WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 (manuscript at ch. 13).
Weber, 443 U.S. at 206 n.6.
Id. at 207. Brennan’s emphasis on managerial freedom was apparently critical to securing
Justice Stewart’s vote and thus securing a majority decision with precedential value.
Deborah C. Malamud, The Story of United Steelworkers of America v. Brian Weber, in
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 173, 212-16, 218-21 (Joel William Friedman ed.,
2006).
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legislative history, and uniform precedent.”85 But a majority of the Court found
that Title VII permitted the training program.86
3. A Weber What If?
By preventing the Court from considering the constitutionality of Kaiser’s
program, the state action doctrine likely not only saved the program, but also
either prevented a colorblind interpretation of Title VII or forestalled a strict
scrutiny approach to affirmative action. The state action doctrine also
channeled the Court in Weber towards an affirmative-action tolerant
interpretation of Title VII that immunized voluntary employer preferences
when they came under sustained attack in the 1980s. My argument relies
entirely on counterfactual, which as a historian I am trained to distrust. But I
am setting aside those compunctions and making a more lawyerly case.
The first (if unlikely) threat was that the Court would avoid the
constitutional question by adopting a colorblind interpretation of Title VII, as
the concurring Justices had for Title VI in Bakke. Justices Powell and Stevens
did not participate in Weber. Brennan wrote for the majority. Of the remaining
six Justices, four (Thurgood Marshall, Potter Stewart, Byron White, and Harry
Blackmun) joined Brennan’s interpretation of Title VII. Two of them would
thus have had to defect on the statutory interpretation to avoid having to
address the constitutional question. Only one, Stewart, had joined the
colorblind interpretation of Title VI in Bakke.87 For reasons discussed further
below, White might have provided the second vote, securing a colorblind
interpretation of Title VII.
If the constitutional question had been reached rather than avoided, it was
quite possible (if far from certain) that the Court would have done what it had
refrained from doing in Bakke: hold that preferences triggered strict scrutiny.
This is where my counterfactual gets the most questionable from a historian’s
perspective, because it relies not on predicting the future based on the past, but
the past based on the future.88 But here goes. Although Weber did not press the

85.
86.
87.
88.

Weber, 443 U.S. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 201-02 (majority opinion).
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 416 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Of course, Weber may have affected the Court’s approach in its later equal protection cases,
adding a degree of circularity to my argument. I find it unlikely that this occurred as none of
the Justices viewed Weber as involving state action or the private employers and government
certified unions it concerned as being state actors and thus none saw the case as implicating
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constitutional question, Bakke was just the first in a steady stream of cases in
which the Court considered the constitutionality of various affirmative action
programs. In fact, one year after Weber, the Court considered a minority setaside for federal contracts in Fullilove v. Klutznick.89 Of the seven Justices
participating in Weber, two—Justices Rehnquist and Stewart—subjected the
federal affirmative action program to strict scrutiny in Fullilove.90 Three,
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, favored applying intermediate
scrutiny.91 That leaves Chief Justice Burger and Justice White. Both declined to
decide the proper level of scrutiny to apply in Fullilove, finding the program
passed muster under either.92
There are good reasons to predict that a majority in our hypothetical Weber
would favor strict scrutiny. Over the course of the 1980s, first Burger and then
White signed on to the strict scrutiny standard.93 Burger’s initial openness to
applying intermediate scrutiny to the federal affirmative action program in
Fullilove did not mean that he would have backed a lower level of scrutiny in
Weber. Instead, his opinion in Fullilove repeatedly emphasized the special
deference the Court owed Congress as a co-equal branch and the uniquely

89.
90.

91.
92.
93.

equal protection doctrine. Even if Weber did affect the Justices’ later approach to affirmative
action under the equal protection doctrine, however, it likely limited rather than exaggerated
the Court’s scrutiny. In other words, it is hard to imagine that if the Kaiser plan had been
found instead to violate Title VII, the Court would have subsequently applied lesser rather
than greater scrutiny to public affirmative action programs or found the ambit of permissible
programs greater under equal protection than under Title VII. If the actual Weber decision
had any effect on subsequent equal protection doctrine, therefore, it most likely minimized
rather than maximized the Court’s scrutiny. If the hypothetical Weber would fail under even
the minimized scrutiny the actual Weber decision might have caused, the counterfactual is at
least as strong if not stronger than if the actual Weber had no effect on the Court’s
subsequent equal protection decisions.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
Id. at 523 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Under our Constitution, any official action that treats a
person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect and
presumptively invalid.” (emphasis added)). Justices Powell and Stevens (though less clearly
so) also would apply strict scrutiny. Id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 537 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Id. at 472 (plurality opinion).
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (affirming the use of strict
scrutiny for racial preferences); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986)
(analyzing whether the layoff provision at issue serves a compelling government interest
and is narrowly tailored).
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broad scope of Congress’s remedial powers.94 His openness to applying
intermediate scrutiny to the federal affirmative action program in Fullilove thus
did not mean that he would have backed a lower level of scrutiny in Weber.
Further supporting this outcome, Burger favored a colorblind interpretation of
Title VI in Bakke and of Title VII in Weber.95 Justice White is a trickier case
since he had favored intermediate scrutiny in Bakke. The fact that he chose to
avoid the level of scrutiny question in Fullilove suggests that he was not
wedded to intermediate scrutiny, however. Also, even before he signed on to
strict scrutiny, he began finding that affirmative action policies denied equal
protection, in agreement with the Justices that applied it.96 It is likely, then,
that at least Chief Justice Burger and possibly Justice White would have
provided the two remaining votes necessary to constitute a majority in favor of
applying strict scrutiny in our counter-factual version of Weber. If they did, the
fact that the non-participating Justice Powell was already on record supporting
strict scrutiny would have made the full Court’s alignment on the issue appear
secure.97 That the other non-participant, Justice Stevens, also seemed to
embrace strict scrutiny the next year in Fullilove would have made the
alignment starker.98

94.
95.

96.
97.
98.

Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483; id. at 472.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 416 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 217 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[U]nder the plain language of § 703(d), [a
quota] is ‘an unlawful employment practice.’”).
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 196 (1987) (White, J., dissenting); Wygant, 476
U.S. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring).
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Racial classifications are simply too
pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and
classification.”). Notably, if White instead backed intermediate scrutiny in Weber, as a
matter of precedent, head-counting, and optics, the result would not have seemed as secure.
First, Powell would likely have participated and joined on the side of strict scrutiny, making
an evenly split court. See Malamud, supra note 84, at 215 n.126. Even if he did not, with only
four votes in the majority, the decision would have had no precedential effect. Going
forward, Stevens would be the decisive vote. Although he eventually switched sides, as of
1979 he was most associated with the colorblind constitutionalists, making an application of
intermediate scrutiny in Weber seem weak. Because the outcome would be non-precedential,
it would have eliminated the actual Weber’s later protective effects, which are described
below. Even if the Court somehow cobbled together a five-Justice majority for a statutory
interpretation of Title VII akin to that adopted in the actual Weber decision, that
interpretation would have been weaker than Weber’s. This is because, as the constitutional
test in whose shadow the Court interpreted Title VII became more stringent, that statutory
interpretation would appear weakened and more open for revision or repudiation. This
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If the Court had applied strict scrutiny in Weber, it would almost definitely
have found Kaiser’s program unconstitutional, demonstrating why preserving
government by numbers in the workplace required creating space between the
treatment of employer preferences under Title VII and equal protection. This
step also involves counterfactual speculation, as the Court would settle on what
standard to apply to affirmative action (strict scrutiny) before flushing out how
to apply that standard.99 Applying Justice Powell’s test from Bakke and
Fullilove, however, is probably a safe approach.100 As more Justices signed on to
strict scrutiny during the 1980s, they complained that Powell’s version was not
strict enough.101 If Weber would fail Powell’s test, therefore, it would likely fail
any articulation of strict scrutiny.
Under Powell’s approach, it is unlikely that the Court would have found
that the Kaiser plan furthered a compelling interest. As an end in itself,
“[r]acial preference never can constitute a compelling state interest,” Powell
insisted.102 Nor was the diversity rationale Powell found compelling in Bakke
advanced in Weber or clearly applicable, given Powell’s heavy reliance on
factors particular to education.103 Powell did allow that “ameliorating, or

99.

100.

101.

102.
103.

might have eliminated some or all of the protective effects the actual Weber’s construction of
Title VII had during the 1980s, most notably the weight it was given under the doctrine of
stare decisis.
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny
to Richmond’s minority set-aside program but finding it “almost impossible to assess
whether the Richmond Plan is narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination since it is
not linked to identified discrimination in any way”); see also Neal Devins, Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing Irrelevance of Supreme Court Affirmative Action
Decisions, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 673, 698 (1996) (describing the Court’s affirmative action
decisions as “indecisive, saying little that can be generalized beyond the facts of a particular
dispute”).
Powell restated his application of strict scrutiny in Fullilove, relying primarily but not
exclusively on Bakke. As it is more concise and clearly stated, I use his articulation of the test
in Fullilove here.
See, e.g., Paradise, 480 U.S. at 197 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court adopts a
standardless view of ‘narrowly tailored’ far less stringent than that required by strict
scrutiny . . . .”).
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 497 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (plurality opinion).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15 (plurality opinion). Even if diversity were claimed and accepted,
Powell made clear that a quota (also at issue in Weber) was not an acceptable means of
advancing that interest. Id. at 319-20; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328, 334
(2003) (accepting diversity as a compelling government interest but noting that “[t]o be
narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system”); cf.
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Note, Grutter at Work: A Title VII Critique of Constitutional
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eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination”
was a compelling interest.104 But he limited it to discrimination that was
identified through “judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations.”105 As Powell found the university
admissions office in Bakke incapable of making the predicate finding, he would
of necessity find Kaiser Aluminum and its unions similarly incapacitated.106 In
Weber, the Court took judicial notice, based on “numerous” lower court
decisions, of the craft union discrimination said to explain Kaiser’s decision to
adopt its plan.107 Perhaps our hypothetical Weber court would, as the actual
one did, accept prior judicial findings of discrimination in lieu of findings by
the institutionally incompetent policy adopter. This still would not save the
Kaiser plan, however. The actual Weber court found “break[ing] down old
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy” in “occupations which have been
traditionally closed to” a protected class sufficient justification for employer
preferences.108 But Powell insisted that countering this sort of “societal
discrimination” could not justify a racial preference for strict scrutiny
purposes.109

104.
105.

106.

107.
108.
109.

Affirmative Action, 115 YALE L.J. 1408, 1417 (2006) (noting that accepting diversity as a
compelling interest is inconsistent with requiring individualized analysis and arguing that
the Court’s “narrow-tailoring analysis . . . eschews numerical accountability”).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (plurality opinion).
Id.; see also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 497-98 (explaining that to establish a compelling interest,
the governmental body imposing the racial preference has to be empowered to make a
finding of discrimination and to have done so).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309-10 (plurality opinion) (“Petitioner does not purport to have made,
and is in no position to make, such findings. . . . Lacking this capability, petitioner has not
carried its burden of justification on this issue.”).
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197-98 (1979).
Id. at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310 (plurality opinion) (“‘[S]ocietal discrimination’ does not justify a
classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons . . . who bear no responsibility for
whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have
suffered.”); see id. at 296 n.36; cf. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288 (1986)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I agree with the plurality that a governmental agency’s interest
in remedying ‘societal’ discrimination, that is, discrimination not traceable to its own
actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster under strict
scrutiny.”). The Court’s early affirmative action decisions allowed greater leeway for
Congress to counter society-wide discrimination. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490; id. at 516
(Powell, J., concurring). These decisions also suggested that a state or local legislative body
might have some ability to “eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own
legislative jurisdiction.” City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1989)
(plurality opinion); see also Ian Ayres & Frederick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination

2983

the yale law journal

123:2964

2014

Even if Kaiser’s plan were somehow deemed to advance a compelling
interest, it likely would have failed the narrow tailoring test. Some of the
factors Weber considered to determine the plan’s comportment with Title VII
were similar to those Powell employed under equal protection.110 Other factors
were different but not in ways likely to lead to different outcomes.111 Powell’s
narrow tailoring test imposed a unique criterion, however, which Kaiser’s plan
would most certainly fail, even if it would stand under all the remaining

110.

111.

Justify Public Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577, 1607 n.108 (1998) (arguing that
scholars have underestimated the room the Court left for affirmative action that redresses
societal discrimination). But even if the Court had been willing to give an employer and
union the same leeway as a legislature (itself fairly unthinkable), the Court held that “an
amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular industry,” all that
was claimed in Weber, “cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota.” Croson, 488
U.S. at 499; see also id. at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins
of Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (1986)
(observing that the Court “approved affirmative action only as precise penance for the
specific sins of racism a government, union, or employer has committed in the past”).
For instance, both considered the duration of the preferences, with temporariness auguring
in favor of permissibility. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring); Weber, 443 U.S.
at 208. Both tests weighed the impact on “innocent third parties,” Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 514
(Powell, J., concurring); Weber, 443 U.S. at 208, looking particularly askance at any plan
that would require white workers’ layoff or discharge. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208; see also
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 182 (1987) (finding a 50% promotion quota
narrowly tailored because it was not an “‘absolute bar’ to white advancement” and did not
require layoffs or discharges); id. at 189 (Powell, J., concurring); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal
Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 488 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); Fullilove,
448 U.S. at 514-15 (Powell, J., concurring); cf. Wygant, 476 U.S. 267 (holding
unconstitutional an affirmative action policy that called for white employees to be laid off
before African American employees with less seniority). Although there is some question
whether this factor is applied identically under Title VII and equal protection, I will assume
the Kaiser plan could pass muster since the Court subsequently affirmed the
constitutionality of a similar 50% promotion quota. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 183. That said, the
long history of employer intransigence in Paradise suggests that the Court might have been
more willing to tolerate the burden in Paradise than it would have been in Weber where no
such history was involved.
Compare Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (requiring that the plan was “not intended to maintain
racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance”), with Fullilove, 448 U.S.
at 510 (Powell, J., concurring) (considering “the relationship between the percentage of
minority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority group members in the
relevant population or workforce”). Using this standard, goals set at or below the targeted
group’s percentage of the relevant population or workforce easily passed muster. See Sheet
Metal Workers’ Int’l, 478 U.S. at 487; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513-14 (Powell, J., concurring).
But for the reasons given supra note 110 regarding the 50% quota in Paradise, I will assume
Kaiser’s disproportionately large quota would have survived this prong as well, with a
similar caveat regarding the generosity of this assumption. Paradise, 480 U.S at 179-81.
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factors112: Powell’s test required that no alternative, less “trammeling” remedies
were available.113 Indeed, in the cases where Powell was willing to find that a
preference, let alone a disproportionately large quota like that used in the
Kaiser plan, was narrowly tailored, he did so in part because more moderate
remedies had been tried and failed.114 No such history existed at Kaiser.115
* * *
The Court might have adopted a colorblind interpretation of Title VII or
found that the Kaiser plan violated equal protection had the state action
doctrine not foreclosed this inquiry in Weber. But this thought experiment is
about more than the fate of Kaiser’s voluntary quota. The attack on affirmative
action began in earnest in the 1980s when the Reagan Justice Department set
out to eliminate all racial preferences. That Weber had instead read Title VII to
allow the Kaiser plan provided a bulwark for employers’ voluntary preferences
during the 1980s attack.

112.

113.
114.

115.

Powell also uniquely required that the preferences scheme include “waiver provisions if the
hiring plan could not be met, Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 511 (Powell, J., concurring), a
requirement the Kaiser plan easily met because filling the quota was conditioned on there
being sufficient qualified minority applicants, Weber, 443 U.S. at 223 n.3 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring).
Paradise, 480 U.S at 172-76; id. at 186, 188 (Powell, J., concurring); Sheet Metal Workers’
Int’l, 478 U.S. at 486-87. The Court has applied this requirement quite rigorously where
legislatures were countering society-wide discrimination within their jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); cf. Parents Involved in Cmty.
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 784 (2007) (requiring, as a component of the
least restrictive means prong, that the defendant “establish, in detail, how decisions based
on an individual student’s race are made in a challenged governmental program”).
Most obviously, Kaiser did not first try an in-house training program without quotas or
with proportional rather than super-proportional ones. Deborah Malamud reports that
Kaiser had experimented with in-house training prior to the plan challenged in Weber, but it
is not clear when it was tried, whether this training was available to minority applicants
(Malamud describes evidence that it was operated on a discriminatory basis), or whether it
was tried at the plant in which the quota plan was challenged. Malamud, supra note 84, at
194, 209. Further, the parties had agreed at trial that prior to the quota plan, Kaiser had
failed to provide in-house training at the plant at issue, so no prior efforts were in the
record. Id. at 196-97.

2985

the yale law journal

123:2964

2014

iii. state action’s lingering protective effects
The actual Weber decision allowed an employer to defend against a claim of
reverse discrimination by establishing that its complained of actions were part
of a Title VII-compliant affirmative action program. During the 1980s, this test
helped preserve voluntary affirmative action under Title VII and opened a
divide between its analysis under Title VII and equal protection.
A. The Reagan Administration’s Attack on Preferences
The legal attack on preferences, thus far waged by individuals and unions,
got an enormous boost when President Reagan put the resources and
considerable Supreme Court capital of the executive branch behind it.
Immediately after taking office, Reagan assured that his “administration is
going to be dedicated to equality” but opposed to any “affirmative action
programs becoming quota systems.”116 Again, after reelection, he reminded the
nation that he had run against quotas in both campaigns, and claimed a
mandate to eliminate them.117 As President, he appointed opponents of racial
preferences to key civil rights positions, including as Chairman of the Civil
Rights Commission and the EEOC.118
Reagan’s appointment of William Bradford Reynolds to head the Justice
Department’s Civil Rights Division most threatened government by numbers
under Title VII. Reynolds promptly critiqued “racial formulas, such as hiring
quotas and fixed goals . . . in the work place.”119 These formulas “create[d] a
caste system in which an individual must be unfairly disadvantaged for each
person who is preferred,” Reynolds urged, and were “as offensive to standards
of human decency today as they were some 84 years ago when countenanced

116.
117.
118.

119.

Ronald Reagan, The President’s News Conference (Jan. 29, 1981), http://www.presidency
.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44101.
Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Civil Rights (June 15, 1985), http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=38782.
Ernest Holsendolph, Skills, Not Bias, Seen as Key for Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, July 3,
1982, http://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/03/us/skills-not-bias-seen-as-key-for-jobs.html;
John T. McQuiston, Clarence M. Pendleton, 57, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/06/obituaries/clarence-m-pendleton-57-dies-head
-of-civil-rights-commission.html.
William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Att’y General, Civil Rights Division, Dep’t of Justice,
Remarks at the Fourth Annual Conference on Equal Employment Opportunity: Recent
Developments in Federal Regulations and Case Law 7 (Oct. 20, 1981), http://files.eric.ed
.gov/fulltext/ED208160.pdf.
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under Plessy v. Ferguson.”120 The White House quickly assembled a special task
force on employment discrimination,121 and Reynolds publicly announced his
desire to, as the Wall Street Journal put it, “get the Supreme Court to rule that it
is illegal and unconstitutional to give minorities and women preference in
hiring and promotion.”122 The administration’s attack would be wholesale.
Reynolds “bridled at government-imposed preferences and ‘race-conscious
relief,’ even as a remedy for proven discrimination.”123 Instead, remedies could
benefit “only the individuals discriminated against. . . . Relief, as the tag went,
must be victim-specific; if so it is color-blind, for it is predicated on victim
status, not race.”124 Reconsidering Weber, limiting relief under Title VII,
securing strict scrutiny for preferences, and ensuring that narrow tailoring
would, with exceedingly minimal exceptions, be “fatal in fact”125—all would be
on the administration’s sweeping agenda.
In complicated ways, Reynolds’s plans were limited by the state action
doctrine. Most obviously, the state action doctrine had secured Weber, a
precedent that provided a drag on the administration’s attack over the course of
the 1980s.
B. Weber’s Protective Effects
Weber delayed and sculpted the Reagan administration’s challenge to
voluntary employer preferences and helped protect them once that attack
occurred.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 8 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND
ACCOUNT 105 (1991).
Robert E. Taylor, Civil Rights Division Head Will Seek Supreme Court Ban on Affirmative
Action, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1981, at A4.
FRIED, supra note 121, at 105.
Id.
See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)
(describing strict scrutiny as “fatal in fact”). But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(upholding Michigan Law School’s racially conscious admissions program under strict
scrutiny); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (rejecting the idea
that strict scrutiny is “fatal in fact”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361-62
(1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (“[O]ur review under the Fourteenth Amendment should be strict—not
‘strict in theory and fatal in fact,’ because it is stigma that causes fatality—but strict and
searching nonetheless.” (quoting Gunther, supra)).
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1. Equal Protection Not Title VII; Public Not Private
With Weber so recently decided, the Reagan administration initially
avoided the issue of voluntary employer preferences under Title VII. When
Reynolds laid out his agenda in 1981, he opined that “Weber is wrongly
decided” and expressed hope that, were the Court to revisit the issue, “it would
arrive at a different conclusion.”126 He also spoke out against all uses of
“statistical formulae” in the workplace.127 But attacking voluntary employer
preferences under Title VII would not be the administration’s immediate
goal.128 For the most part, the administration challenged courts’ authority to
order—not employers’ leeway to voluntarily adopt—affirmative action
programs.129 To the extent that Reynolds focused on voluntary preferences, he
pledged to fight for constitutional constraints on their use and focused on
public, not private, employers.130 For instance, the government sought
unsuccessfully to intervene before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in a
challenge to an affirmative action policy adopted by the Detroit Police
Department.131 As the Los Angeles Times reported, the Justice Department
argued “that public employers are barred by the Constitution from voluntarily
setting up promotion plans based on race, even though the Supreme Court [in
Weber] approved them for private employers.”132
Further, when Reynolds subsequently targeted voluntary employer
preferences under Title VII during Reagan’s second term, he sought to

126.
127.

128.

129.

130.
131.

132.

See Taylor, supra note 122.
William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Att’y General, Civil Rights Division, Dep’t of Justice,
Remarks Before the 1983 Mid-Winter Meeting of the American Bar Association Equal
Employment Law Committee 7 (Mar. 4, 1983) (on file with author); see also Reynolds, supra
note 119 (critiquing the “use of racial formulas” in the workplace).
Indeed, in 1981, Reynolds reassured a House Subcommittee that “the Weber case is now the
law. It would be improper and irresponsible of me to act in a way that is contrary to the
law.” NORMAN C. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 136 n.131
(1988).
Administration Challenges Minority Plan, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1983, at B18. See, e.g., Brief of
the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Firefighters Local Union No.
1784 v. Carl W. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (No. 82-206) (1984), http://www.justice.gov
/osg/briefs/1983/sg830186.txt.
Taylor, supra note 122.
Bratton v. City of Detroit, 712 F.2d 222, 223 n.1 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting that the Justice
Department had submitted an amicus brief in support of granting rehearing that arrived
after a majority of the Court had already voted to deny).
Administration Challenges Minority Plan, supra note 129.
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circumvent Weber by challenging public employer programs. Reynolds’s
influence grew after Reagan’s reelection, as he joined the Justice Department’s
litigation steering committee and his protégés from the Civil Rights Division
moved into influential positions in the Department.133 He also gained a
powerful ally in Edwin Meese, a close adviser of Reagan’s who became
Attorney General in 1985. Meese quickly declared that “[c]ounting by race is a
form of racism.”134 The Reagan administration, he asserted, “reject[ed] . . .
unequivocally” the argument that affirmative action required “race-conscious,
preferential treatment.”135 Instead, using “racially preferential quotas . . . is
nothing short of a legal, moral and constitutional tragedy.”136 Upon reelection,
Reagan specifically singled out for attack the use of voluntary quotas under
Title VII, declaring them “exactly what the civil rights laws were designed to
stop.”137
Reagan’s Justice Department did not challenge Weber head on, however.
Instead, it built on Justice Rehnquist’s unusual dissent when the Court in 1985
declined to review an appellate court decision upholding a state’s voluntary
preferences under Weber.138 Rehnquist quoted Weber’s caveat that Kaiser’s plan
“does not involve state action” and urged that the Court should address how
the presence of state action affected the Weber framework.139 The preferences’
violation of equal protection was not at issue in the denied petition, Rehnquist
acknowledged. But he urged that “when a state employer claims that arguably
discriminatory conduct on its part is nonetheless authorized by Title VII, the
claim of such statutory authorization must be considered in the light of the

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

138.

139.

See DOUGLAS KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT 153 (1992).
Edwin Meese, Att’y General, Constitution Day Speech at Dickinson College 19 (Sept. 17,
1985), http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistory/meese/1985/09-17-1985.pdf.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Reagan, supra note 117. On the Reagan administration’s anti-affirmative action policies
generally, see DOBBINS, supra note 48, at 133-38; FRIED, supra note 121, at ch. 4; KMIEC, supra
note 133, at ch. 7; and MACLEAN, supra note 64, at 300-05.
Bushey v. N.Y. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 733 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that under Weber a
state agency could separately normalize the scores of minority and nonminority takers of a
qualifying exam in order to avoid disproportionate numbers of nonminority candidates for
promotion), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1117 (1985).
Bushey, 469 U.S. at 1117 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200 (1979)).
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prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.”140 Even if Congress intended
private employers to have the leeway to adopt voluntary preferences that Weber
provided, Rehnquist contended that it could not have intended to allow state
and local employers “to claim that their actions were shielded under Title VII
even if the actions would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”141 It was this
narrower point only that Reynolds pursued during Reagan’s second term.142
2. Precedential Effects
When the Justice Department eventually challenged public employers’
voluntary preferences under Title VII, Weber helped protect them. Most
directly, only because of stare decisis did a majority of the Court find that the
public employer preference at issue in Johnson v. Transportation Agency
comported with Title VII.143 Without Justice Stevens’s joinder, Justice
Brennan’s opinion would not have commanded a majority of the Court.
Stevens joined despite believing that Weber was wrongly decided.144 Weber,
however, was now “an important part of the fabric of our law,” Stevens
explained, which he found a “sufficiently compelling” reason to “adhere to [its]
basic construction of” Title VII.145 That Weber was already on the books also
secured Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in the judgment, decisively ensuring
the continued viability of voluntary employer preferences under Title VII.146
With the remaining three Justices all in favor of reversing Weber, its existence
is all that saved the Court from adopting a colorblind interpretation of Title VII
in Johnson.

140.
141.
142.

143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 1121.
Id.
This was despite calls for a check on private employers’ use of preferences. See, e.g., Herman
Belz, What the Supreme Court Means on Racial Quotas, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1984, at F7.
President Reagan similarly focused only on public employers in his 1985 civil rights address
arguing that voluntary quotas were contrary to Title VII. Reagan, supra note 117 (criticizing
those who “tell us that the Government should enforce discrimination in favor of some
groups through hiring quotas”).
480 U.S. 616 (1987).
See id. at 643-44 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 644.
See id. at 648 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Public employer preferences, as commentators
noted, still hung under equal protection’s ominous cloud. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Affirmative
Action After Reagan, 68 TEX. L. REV. 353, 368 (1989).
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Less tangibly, Weber shielded voluntary preferences through what might be
called the first-mover advantage. While hardly a formal canon of construction,
where other statutes regulated similar conduct but only some involved state
action, the Court’s initial interpretation has bled across the state action line
regardless of the different constitutional stakes.147 Imagine if the Court in
Johnson had been considering for the first time voluntary employer preferences
under Title VII or that my hypothetical Weber had produced a splintered Court
akin to that in Bakke, with neither a constitutional nor statutory ground
prevailing. If so, this first authoritative interpretation of Title VII would have
occurred deeply in the Constitution’s shadow. Indeed, the government and a
dissenting Justice Scalia urged the Court in Johnson to follow the approach
Rehnquist had suggested previously and read equal protection limits into Title
VII.148 For the reasons discussed in the Weber hypothetical, this would have led
to a narrower ambit for voluntary employer preferences.149 This more crabbed
interpretation, in turn, might have then been applied in the private employer
context due to the first-mover effect.150 Instead, the inertial path ran in the
other direction: the Court swept aside equal protection concerns in Johnson,151

147.

148.

149.

150.
151.

For instance, under the federal labor laws, the Supreme Court first interpreted the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C § 152 (2006), to bar unions from using money collected from the
workers they represented for political purposes to which those workers objected. See Int’l
Assoc. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). In doing so, the Court avoided First
Amendment issues that would have been raised had the statute not been so interpreted. Id.
at 750; see also Railway Employees’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (reserving
judgment with respect to cases where “the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is
used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the
First Amendment”). That interpretation was then extended as a matter of First Amendment
doctrine to public sector workers organized under similar state law provisions, Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 226 (1977), and later to private sector workers organized
under an entirely different statute, the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69
(2012), where neither the direct nor avoided constitutional issues pertained, Commc’ns
Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
Johnson, 480 U.S. 616, 664-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (No. 85-1129), 1986 WL 728148
at *11 (“Victim specific, make whole relief is the natural and usual remedial corollary to the
substantive ‘individual rights’ principle of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.”).
Cf. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (striking down a layoff preference
under equal protection in part because it targeted societal as opposed to employer-specific
discrimination).
See supra note 147.
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 620 n.2.
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and applied Weber’s test, emphatically crafted for the private sector, to the
public employer involved.152
* * *
Thanks to the Court’s narrow, formal approach to state action, during the
1980s, Title VII preserved space for voluntary preferences by private employers
that were no longer available to public employers under equal protection.
Going forward, even the Reagan Justice Department conceded that the test
under Title VII was more permissive than under equal protection.153
iv. state action to the rescue again?
In 2009 the Supreme Court in Ricci v. DeStefano did what it had refused to
do in Johnson: interpret Title VII in light of equal protection standards.154 Ricci
involved a reverse discrimination claim against a city for deciding not to certify
the results of a promotion exam on which “white candidates had outperformed
minority candidates.”155 In defense, city officials argued that, if “they had
certified the results, they could have faced liability under Title VII for adopting
a practice that had a disparate impact on the minority firefighters.”156 The
Court avoided applying equal protection directly by finding the city’s actions
violated Title VII.157 Equal protection nonetheless crept into the Court’s
analysis, as Justices Rehnquist and Scalia as well as the Reagan administration

152.

153.
154.
155.
156.

157.

Id. at 627 (“The assessment of the legality of the Agency Plan must be guided by our
decision in Weber.”). Although beyond the scope of this essay, Weber also helped protect
judicial use of numbers-based remedies under Title VII when they also came under attack in
the 1980s. See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448, 453,
463, 479 (1986).
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: CHOICES
AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 49 (1988).
557 U.S. 557 (2009).
Id. at 562.
Id. at 563. Disparate impact liability can attach if an employer adopts a practice that
disproportionately disadvantages protected workers unless the employer demonstrates that
the practice is a “business necessity” and the plaintiff cannot identify a less discriminatory
alternative. Id. at 577-78 (discussing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2006))).
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 563.
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had urged it should in the 1980s.158 How broadly Ricci sweeps is as yet
unclear.159 As courts work this question out, the state action doctrine could
once again shield some voluntary employer preferences.
Ricci newly imports equal protection standards into Title VII analysis of
employers’ preferential practices. Finding that Title VII’s disparate impact and
disparate treatment provisions were “in conflict absent a rule to reconcile
them,”160 the Court turned to “cases similar to this one, albeit in the context of
the Equal Protection Clause.”161 Specifically, Ricci borrowed these equal
protection cases’ requirement that an employer have a “‘strong basis in
evidence’ that [its] remedial actions were necessary” before a court will find the
employer’s race-conscious efforts to remedy past racial discrimination
constitutional.162 Translated into the Title VII context, in order to escape
liability, Ricci required an employer to have a strong basis in evidence that its
abandoned practices either “were not job related and consistent with business
necessity, or” if they were, that “there existed an equally valid, lessdiscriminatory alternative that” the employer had “refused to adopt.”163
Thus far, Ricci has not spelled the end of voluntary employer preferences
but it has created the need to distinguish the preferences to which the
framework applies. Ricci does not mention Johnson or Weber,164 and the Ricci
dissenters explicitly distinguish the employer defense rejected therein from that
allowed in Johnson and Weber.165 Whether that distinction will hold is as yet
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161.
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See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
Academic predictions about Ricci’s impact diverge widely. See, e.g., Barbara Jean D’Aquila, A
Management Employment Lawyer’s Perspective on Ricci v. DeStefano, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L.
213, 221 (2010) (interpreting Ricci to indicate “that when the employer is undertaking
voluntary affirmative action to achieve the objectives of Title VII, Ricci’s stricter strongbasis-in-evidence standard should not apply and that prior affirmative action decisions
remain valid”); Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341
(2010) (identifying two interpretations of Ricci compatible with disparate impact and one
interpretation under which disparate impact conflicts with equal protection).
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 580.
Id. at 582.
Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)). The Court
states that it is only borrowing equal protection doctrine, which is seemingly different than
finding that Title VII must be construed to comport with equal protection. As Richard
Primus has argued, however, equal protection reasoning infects Ricci’s entire analysis,
rendering the decision a de facto conflation of the two. Primus, supra note 159, at 1362.
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 587.
See id.
Id. at 626 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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undetermined. The majority opinion contains language that could sweep
broadly to include preferences such as those in Weber and Johnson that are
adopted to correct a “manifest imbalance” as well as language promising the
decision’s narrow reach.166 Lower courts thus far have interpreted Ricci to
apply only to public employer preferences adopted to avoid disparate impact
liability.167 The Second Circuit has given the question its most extensive
treatment, finding that the Weber/Johnson framework still applies if a public
employer prospectively adopts preferences to benefit a protected class
generally.168
As yet unaddressed is the Ricci test’s application to private employers’
preferences, whether adopted to avoid disparate impact liability or to “break
down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.”169 Whatever position
the Supreme Court takes regarding the Second Circuit’s approach to public
employers, the state action doctrine could (and indeed should) foreclose Ricci’s
application to private employer preferences under either the disparate impact or
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168.
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Compare id. at 583 (majority opinion) (“[T]he standard appropriately constrains employers’
discretion in making race-based decisions.”), with id. at 585 (“We hold only that, under Title
VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of
avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong
basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the
race-conscious, discriminatory action.”).
See, e.g., NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 484 (3d Cir. 2011)
(distinguishing Ricci, where defendants had to choose between possible disparate impact
liability and a definite disparate treatment action, from the instant case, in which “North
Hudson face[d] a classic disparate-impact claim, one that we have resolved based on the
three-step inquiry dictated by the statute”); United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 97-99,
104 (2d Cir. 2011); Humphries v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 580 F.3d 688, 693-97 (8th
Cir. 2009) (applying the Weber/Johnson framework to a school district’s affirmative action
policies, including the use of biracial hiring committees as well as minority hiring goals and
quotas); Shea v. Kerry, 961 F. Supp. 2d 17, 54 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Weber and Johnson while
describing the standards by which courts analyze affirmative action plans and noting that
“[w]hile the tide may be turning against this approach to affirmative action, it has yet to
directly reach Johnson’s Title VII standard”); cf. Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 654 F.3d 200,
208-09 (2d Cir. 2011) (construing Ricci not to allow employers to defend against disparate
impact claims by asserting a “strong basis in evidence” that it would have been subject to
disparate treatment liability).
Brennan, 650 F.3d at 104 (finding that Title VII’s disparate treatment provision “draws a
distinction between affirmative action plans, which are intended to provide ex ante benefits to
all members of a racial or gender class, and make-whole relief, which is intended to provide ex
post benefits to specified individuals who have suffered discrimination,” and stating that the
Weber/Johnson framework applies only to the former).
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
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Weber/Johnson defense. The strong-basis-in-evidence test that Ricci borrowed
is derived from strict scrutiny’s compelling interest prong.170 Even the Court’s
conservative Justices (indeed, especially the Court’s conservative Justices)
should find imposing this standard on private employers unwarranted. If Ricci
did no more than borrow a standard from equal protection doctrine, then as a
matter of statutory construction, this borrowing is less justified in the private
sector. In Ricci, the only factor the Court weighed in favor of maximizing
employer flexibility was “Congress’s intent that ‘voluntary compliance’ be ‘the
preferred means of achieving the objectives of Title VII.’”171 Regarding private
employers, however, an additional factor weighs in favor of flexibility and
against Ricci’s borrowing: what Justice Brennan in Weber described as
Congress’s desire to limit federal regulation of the private sector and maximize
“traditional business freedom.”172 This desire derives from the same
public/private divide that animates the traditional state action doctrine.
As a matter of constitutional law, whether Ricci merely borrows equal
protection doctrine or is conforming Title VII to it, the Justices in the Ricci
majority should be loath to extend its test to private sector employers. If
Congress intended equal protection doctrine to sculpt the scope of Title VII as
applied to state and local employers has been debated since at least Johnson.173
But whatever arguments this position has in its favor, they evaporate as regards
the private sector—especially for those wedded to a narrow conception of state
action. State and local employers’ voluntary preferences are undeniably
infected with state action and Congress, in applying Title VII to them, relied
on its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection
provisions.174 In contrast, Congress grounded the Title VII provisions

170.
171.
172.
173.

174.

See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (quoting Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)).
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 581 (quoting Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S.
501, 515 (1986)).
Weber, 443 U.S. at 207; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Devins, supra note 146, at 369-70 (surveying arguments for and against this
position); Herman Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It’s All Over but the
Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REV. 524, 542 (1987) (“[I]f Congress thought there would be such a
difference between public and private employers, with the constitutional provisions
significantly more stringent than those of Title VII, it surely would have so indicated.”).
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat. 103, 107
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c)-(e) (2006)). The Title VII amendments
were explicitly passed under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2154.
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governing private actors solely on its Commerce Clause authority.175
Furthermore, these provisions merely permit private actors to use voluntary
preferences, a form of state action even the Warren Court at its height never
found to trigger constitutional scrutiny.176 There is thus no basis for importing
equal protection standards into Title VII review of private employers’
voluntary preferences. Indeed, doing so would violate one of the central tenets
of the state action doctrine. As Reagan’s former Solicitor General Charles
Fried, a strong supporter of the state action divide and the colorblind
Constitution, has argued, “the notion that governments are bound by stricter
rules than are private actors” renders Weber “appropriate.”177
Even if Title VII does more than permit those preferences adopted to avoid
disparate impact liability, there is still not sufficient state action to trigger
constitutional concerns. Some affirmative action critics argue that Title VII not
only permits, but also actually encourages employer preferences by providing
disparate impact liability.178 This claim is at its strongest when an employer

175.

176.

177.

178.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 241, 253-55 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C § 2000e). Although many assumed initially that Title VII as applied to
private actors codified, and thus tracked, the Constitution’s equal protection guarantees, this
view was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976). See generally LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 (manuscript at chs.
8-10). This view of Title VII is also antithetical to the textualist, strict constructionist
approach to statutory interpretation legal conservatives have promoted since the 1970s. See,
e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION (1988).
See supra Subsection III.B.1; see also American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,
52 (1999) (“Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the
State is not state action.” (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982))).
FRIED, supra note 121, at 130; see also Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State Action
Principle and Its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1829-30 (2010) (arguing that the fact that
“current constitutional anti-discrimination norms may not be suited for simple extension to
private people” supports retaining the current narrow state action doctrine). On Fried’s
strict adherence to narrow state action, see LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION, supra note
6 (manuscript at ch. 13). But see Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
29 n.5, Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (No. 85-1129)
1986 WL 728148, at *9 (“As to all employers covered by Title VII, this Court’s prior
pronouncements on the constitutional permissibility of voluntary affirmative action
programs by public employers are instructive with respect to Title VII’s parallel bar of
discrimination, since similar values and interests are at stake.” (emphasis added)).
See FRIED, supra note 121, at 93-96, 119; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 992 (1988) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he inevitable focus on statistics in disparate
impact cases could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic
measures.”); Eang L. Ngov, When “The Evil Day” Comes, Will Title VII’s Disparate Impact
Provision Be Narrowly Tailored to Survive an Equal Protection Clause Challenge?, 60 AM. U. L.
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takes preferential action in order to avoid feared disparate impact liability, as
the city in Ricci did. Yet even this strongest case should not trigger equal
protection concerns in private employment, especially given the state action
contractions of the Burger Court. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist led the Court in more narrowly
construing when a state “exercised coercive power or . . . provided such
significant encouragement . . . that the choice must in law be deemed to be that
of the State.”179
The Court, since articulating the “significant encouragement” test, has
never found that the test was met,180 nor should proponents of a contracted
state action doctrine do so in this instance. Indeed, it would vastly expand the
ambit of state action were the Court to hold that a private decision made to
avoid legal liability sufficed.181 Every action taken to avoid civil or criminal laws
could potentially result in constitutional applicability. For instance, a private
employer that prevents its employees from making racist or sexist remarks in
the workplace in order to avoid hostile work environment claims would trigger
free speech rights for the censured employee. If the employer bars handguns in

179.

180.

181.

REV. 535, 537 (2011) (noting the tension between disparate impact and disparate treatment
liability because the former encourages employers to “make race-conscious employment
decisions to avoid disparate impact liability”); cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 581
(2009) (“Allowing employers to violate the disparate-treatment prohibition based on a mere
good-faith fear of disparate-impact liability would encourage race-based action at the
slightest hint of disparate impact.”).
Compare Blum, 457 U.S. at 1008 (finding that federal regulations generally encouraging a
decision that was “made by private parties according to professional standards that are not
established by the State” did not suffice), with Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)
(finding that a state constitutional amendment repealing a fair housing law encouraged
private discrimination sufficiently to violate equal protection). See LEE, THE WORKPLACE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 6 (manuscript at chs. 10, 13).
See, e.g., American Mfrs. Mut. Ins., 526 U.S. at 52-53 (finding that a law permitting private
insurers to withhold a certain type of payment did not convert such withholdings into state
action and noting that “[w]e have never held that the mere availability of a remedy for
wrongful conduct, even when the private use of that remedy serves important public
interests, so significantly encourages the private activity as to make the State responsible for
it”); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 546-47 (1987)
(holding that where the federal government did no more than “approv[e] of or acquiesce[]
in” the United States Olympic Committee’s enforcement of its exclusive right to use the
word “Olympic,” there was not sufficient state action to trigger Fifth Amendment
protections (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Such a holding regarding Title VII would be all the more sweeping because it would include
not only actions taken to avoid criminal laws but also those taken to avoid far less coercive
civil liability.
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the workplace to avoid violent workplace felonies, its employees could raise
Second Amendment challenges. Just as the current Court would never find that
an employee could directly bring equal protection challenges against a private
employer that adopts a preference in order to avoid disparate impact liability,
the Court should not import equal protection standards into Title VII analysis
of those preferences.
* * *
Even if Johnson falls to Ricci, Weber should not share its fate, nor should
preferences that private sector employers adopt to avoid disparate impact
liability.
conclusion
If and when the Supreme Court addresses Ricci’s application to private
employment, proponents of voluntary employer preferences will have to decide
how to limit its reach. As this history demonstrates, for over thirty years, the
Supreme Court’s narrow view of state action has been these preferences’
primary protection. Proponents would be wise to insist that it remain so. I have
marshaled this history not to map future litigation strategy, however, but to
emphasize how quickly and persistently the reverse-state-action and
government-by-numbers dimensions of Ackerman’s civil rights revolution
came into conflict. With government by numbers secured under Title VII but
increasingly constrained under equal protection, the relationship between the
two became of paramount importance. The narrow state action doctrine
fashioned by the Burger Court directly and indirectly insulated and preserved
government by numbers under Title VII and in the private sector.
What does this mean for Ackerman’s account of the civil rights revolution?
I began by arguing that this history reveals an unexplored tension inherent in
Ackerman’s account. If Title VII truly reworked the state action status of
private employers and unions, then most likely either Title VII would have
been interpreted to prohibit voluntary preferences or they would have been
found unconstitutional. Either way, a key dimension of government by
numbers would have been eliminated from the civil rights revolution’s
response to employment discrimination.182 If so, the civil rights revolution, as
Ackerman describes it, was inherently unstable.

182.

The other dimensions of government by numbers in the workplace that were not insulated
by the state action doctrine have also been threatened by equal protection. See Ricci, 557 U.S.
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a revolution at war with itself?

The tension could be illusory, but explaining it away raises hard and as yet
unanswered questions for Ackerman’s overall theory of extra-Article V
constitutional amendment. One way to explain away the tension is to contend
that it resulted not from conflicts endemic to the civil rights revolution but
from the Court’s failure to appropriately incorporate that revolution’s
constitutional changes. In this account, the Court betrayed the civil rights
revolution when it turned against government by numbers and towards
colorblindness in the equal protection context.
This is a plausible, even attractive, position: scholars have lodged trenchant
critiques of the Court’s colorblind turn since it began.183 But this account raises
questions about how consolidation is measured under Ackerman’s theory.
According to Ackerman, the Court never fully embraced government by
numbers under equal protection.184 Instead, it wavered, reaching back to what
Ackerman calls the anti-humiliation principle in Brown even as it deployed a
colorblind constitutionalism dating to World War II.185 None of the cases
Ackerman discusses involved the workplace. The Court’s first decision
addressing government by numbers under equal protection and in the
employment discrimination context, Washington v. Davis, rejected it.186

183.

184.

185.

186.

at 584 (avoiding deciding whether the city’s actions taken to avoid disparate impact liability
violated equal protection by finding that they violated Title VII); Local No. 93, Int’l. Ass’n.
of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 517 n.8 (1986) (observing that although a
challenged consent decree did not violate Title VII, its compliance with equal protection was
a separate, and likely harder, question); cf. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n
v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (upholding numbers-based judicial remedies for employment
discrimination under equal protection and Title VII, but under extremely egregious facts).
Reva Siegel, in particular, has explored its limitations, inconsistencies, and contestable
roots. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003); Siegel, supra note 65.
For a recent book-length critique, see RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE LAW (2013).
In Ackerman’s view, the Court went the furthest toward government by numbers under
equal protection in the education context, but even there it pulled back. See, e.g., ACKERMAN,
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, ch. 12. esp. 267-69, 272-76, 278-82, 287) (arguing that although
the Court embraced numbers-based judicial remedies in the education context, it rejected
government by numbers for identification purposes, requiring discriminatory intent for an
equal protection violation).
Id. at 257-88. Ackerman argues that the Court’s colorblind decisions do not “deserve[] a
central place in the civil rights canon” because they were merely a judicial effort “to fill in a
gap left in the wake of an epochal set of decisions by We the People.” Id. at 291. They
instead should be treated as “a supplement to, not a substitute for, the principles elaborated
in Brown, Emporia, and the landmark statutes.” Id.; see also id. at 299, 321.
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (declining to apply disparate impact analysis under equal protection).
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Coming in 1976, shortly after Ackerman’s account ends, Davis presses the
question of whether government by numbers was ever consolidated as a matter
of equal protection doctrine, at least in the workplace. An affirmative answer
would resolve the tension I posited, but providing that answer requires
knowing more about how consolidation occurs and when, under Ackerman’s
theory, the window for it closes and that for judicial betrayal opens.
Alternatively, perhaps the tension I identify is illusory because there are
simply two constitutional tracks, one embedded in landmark statutes and the
other in formal constitutional text. On this account, the civil rights revolution
only ever reversed state action under Title VII, leaving intact the traditional
doctrine as a matter of enforcing the Constitution’s equal protection
provisions. This is the sturdiest solution, as it could also allow government by
numbers under Title VII but not equal protection, making easy sense of Davis.
It seems to fall far short of Ackerman’s vision for extra-Article V constitutional
change, however. He inveighs against the legal profession for ignoring
landmark statutes when interpreting Article V-compliant text and urges that
they should inform each other.187 Ackerman promises to address in a future
volume how to synthesize the civil rights revolution across time, then to
now.188 But the fate of government by numbers in the employment
discrimination context also calls for elaborating how synthesis should occur
synchronically, across the statutory and textual domains of Ackerman’s
Constitution. Only by clarifying this dynamic can we truly determine whether
the tension I have posited is illusory or real, and whether it is attributable to
the consolidation, synthesis, or betrayal of the civil rights revolution.

187.
188.

ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 311-42.
Id. at 328-37.
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